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We the People, in Order to Form a More
Perfect Union: A Look at Organic Law as
Foundation for Corporate Restrictions in
Politics
Jonathon Green1

I

n 2010, the Hart Research Associates tracked the sentiments of
the American people in regards to corporate influence on politics. Of those surveyed, eighty-five percent expressed that corporations have too much influence on politics, and ninety-three percent
felt that the average citizen holds too little influence.2 The results of
this study indicate that the public feels that they are being marginalized and not being heard in Washington.
A few months prior to the Hart Research study, the Supreme
Court ruled on the cases Citizens United v. Federal Election Committee (FEC) and Speechnow.org v. FEC. These rulings allowed for
corporations and individuals to donate unlimited funds to political
organizations.3 While it is still too early to see the full implications
of these two rulings, the Court’s move has generated a significant reaction in the media. In their ruling, the Court reasoned that because
corporations are recognized under the law as persons, they also were
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guaranteed protection and rights equal to those enjoyed by human
persons, as found in the Declaration of Independence.4 By doing so,
the Supreme Court overturned one hundred years of restrictions on
corporate donations to political causes—precedent established to
protect the interests of the American people. One hundred forty-six
years prior to this ruling, Abraham Lincoln issued a warning about
the power of corporations that seems appropriate to remember in the
country’s current political climate:
I see in the near future a crisis approaching that unnerves me
and causes me to tremble for the safety of my country. Corporations
have been enthroned, an era of corruption in high places will follow,
and the money-power of the country will endeavor to prolong its
reign by working upon the prejudices of the people until the wealth
is aggregated in a few hands and the Republic is destroyed.5
While Lincoln’s words may be extreme, the core message possesses a valuable warning: the inclusion of corporations in the political arena increases the threat of corruption in politics. To determine
the accuracy of this warning, there should be strict scrutiny over
the next several election cycles to determine whether corruption has
increased with the addition of corporate donations. One way to view
the effects of this would be a game theory analysis between corporations and politicians, to see if potential outcomes of actions lead to
results that are not in the best interests of the public. If this were to
prove the case, then the argument that corporations are not citizens
of the American society would potentially allow the Court to reverse
their decision in Citizens United, and follow the dissenting opinion.

I. History of Corporations as Persons
In 1907 Congress passed the Tillman Act. The Tillman Act
was the first piece of legislation prohibiting corporate donations to
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national political campaigns.6 Senator Benjamin Tillman of South
Carolina sponsored the bill after President Roosevelt called for the
prohibition of corporate contributions. Roosevelt’s actions were in
response to allegations that various corporations were blackmailing
politicians to vote in certain ways, according to an article in The
New York Times on June 17, 1906.7
The implications of the Tillman act were obfuscated with Supreme Court rulings over the twentieth century. Furthermore, the
current situation is the culmination of prior rulings spanning two
centuries. Since 1818, the Supreme Court has determined over
various rulings that corporations are effectively “persons” under
the Constitution, who have rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.8 Furthermore, the ruling of Buckley v. Valeo (1976)
determined that money is a form of speech, which granted a certain
level of protection to political contributions under the First Amendment.9 In the 2010 case Citizens United v. FEC, corporations were
granted the legal right to donate to political causes because they are
persons.10 This ruling is based upon the inalienable right of a person
to exercise free speech under the First Amendment, and invalidated
more than a century of legislation, providing the final blow in a multistep erosion of the precautions established by the Tillman Act.11
A corporation is a body formed and authorized by law to act
as a single person although constituted by one or more persons. It
is legally endowed by the government with various rights and du6
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ties, including the capacity for succession.12 Prior to forming a corporation, the founder must file the Articles of Incorporation. These
are defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “a governing document
that sets forth the basic terms of a corporation’s existence, including the number and classes of shares and the purposes and duration
of the corporation. In most states, the articles of incorporation are
filed with the secretary of state as part of the process of forming the
corporation.”13
During the filing process, a corporation must designate their
purposes for incorporation. These purposes fall into one of two main
categories: corporations that are aimed at profit maximization via
selling of goods and services, and those that are determined as nonprofit. Non-profit corporations include Political Action Committees
(PACs), SuperPACs, and various other entities.14

II. Status Quo
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in the Citizens United case stating:
There is no basis for the proposition that, in the political
speech context, the government may impose restrictions on
certain disfavored speakers. The government may regulate
corporate speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether.15
This ruling upholds the sanctity of the First Amendment, in the
opinion of the majority ruling. By allowing corporations to donate
without restriction, the Court merely extended the legal fiction of
corporations as people. This action appears to be directly in line
with the precedent stretching back to the original case when corpo12
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rations were defined as “persons,” Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward.16 If corporate personhood is sufficiently similar to human personhood, then this gradual allocation of rights was and is a
logical progression.
This is the principle with which the dissenting opinion, as written by Justice John Paul Stevens, takes issue. He wrote:
The notion that the First Amendment dictated [today’s ruling] is, in my judgment, profoundly misguided. In the context of election to public office, the distinction between
corporate and human speakers is significant. Although they
make enormous contributions to our society, corporations
are not actually members of it.17
Stevens’ argument is about whether corporations should be considered in the same context as people in regards to First Amendment rights. He argues that the case should not have been decided
on grounds that corporations are speakers and therefore endowed
with the right to that speech. Rather, Justice Stevens argues that the
context of the speech of corporations in respects to election to public
office is sufficiently different from that of human persons to warrant
additional restrictions on corporations. Continuing in his statement,
he concludes that this difference is the capacity of an individual to
participate as a member of society.
One measure of a corporation’s capacity to participate in society,
and thereby constitute a member thereof, would be to see how the
rules and consequences of regulation in that society affect a corporation. If they are equally in effect for corporations and people, then it
is a sound conclusion that corporations are people in society.
Consider the First Amendment: Congress shall not abridge the
freedom of speech. Ignoring the money-speech debate, it is possible
to infringe this right for human persons by denying them a voice
in public matters, just as it is possible to prevent corporations from
16
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having a “voice” in public matters. In this it appears that a corporation can incur the same injustice as a human. However, the Court
has ruled in limited cases that when it is in the interest of public
safety, human persons do not have the right to free speech.18 Such
exceptions include slander, obscenity, fighting words, and more. If
humans may be limited in their First Amendment rights, albeit under narrowly defined circumstances, then corporations too could be
subjected to similar restriction.
Next, regarding the Second Amendment, if a well-regulated militia is essential, and the people possess the right to bear arms, then
how is this right expressed in a corporation? Does a corporation bear
the right to raise an armed and well-regulated militia? There are corporations that do so, namely entitled as Private Military Companies
(PMC). These firms contract security services, domestically and
abroad. Whether or not this is equated with a person’s right to own a
firearm or to raise a militia with intent of self-defense is debatable. It
is important to note that in order to form a corporation with the intent of acting as a PMC, one needs to obtain approval from the State
Department, for licensing as well as for every contract negotiation.19
This qualification appears to distinguish corporate rights from human citizens’ Second Amendment rights. Yet the counterargument
exists that people have similar restrictions in place for the obtaining
of select firearms, namely fully automatic weaponry.20
With the Fifth Amendment, the question arises of whether a
corporation is deemed equal to a person when it is denied the right
against self-incrimination. The Court has ruled multiple times denying corporations the Fifth Amendment, starting with Hale v. Henkel
(1906) and continuing through to the most recent case of Federal
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Henry Cohen, Cong. Research Serv., 95-815, Freedom of Speech and
Press: Exceptions to the First Amendment (2009).
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Communications Commission V. AT&T Inc. (2011). 21 Human persons
are not obligated to self-incriminate when on trial, but the Court
has unilaterally denied this right to corporations, forcing them to
produce incriminating documents when under subpoena. The difference between the two is that the possible punishments are not equitable between human persons and corporations. If people incriminate
themselves, they risk imprisonment and/or fines. A corporation cannot be imprisoned, and therefore is not on the same terms as a human
person in respects to this right. This is a similar discrepancy to the
one that Justice Stevens noted in his dissenting opinion for the Citizens United case.
Finally, the Fifteenth Amendment states, “The right of citizens
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States.”22 Heretofore, corporations have not been granted the
right to vote. Either corporations are not citizens and not guaranteed
the same rights as citizens, or the current system is unlawfully barring corporations from voting in elections. It is this element of citizenry that provides support to the argument that corporations can be
viewed differently under the law.
In truth, many amendments offer challenges when attempting
to view corporate roles in society. This would appear to support the
argument that Justice Stevens offered in the dissenting opinion that
corporations’ societal position warrants barring them from a voice
in the electoral process. Furthermore, because the Court split five
to four in the case in question, there is strong evidence that Justice
Stevens is not alone in his views and that the government would not
be overstepping its bounds by regulating certain corporate rights,
like free speech.

21

Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); see also Hale v. Henkel,
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III. Game Theory
Since the ruling on Citizens United, there have only been one
presidential and two congressional elections. This limits the amount
of time available for empirical analysis to be successful in determining the effects, positive or negative, of allowing corporations to
donate to politicians and political groups. However, if the motives
behind political donations of people differ from the motives of corporations there is valuable insight into forecasting behavior based
upon those motivations.
People rationally donate primarily to one side or the other of
a political issue, namely the side that most accurately represents
their personal viewpoints. Corporations do not mimic this pattern
of behavior as shown in this report from the Huffington Post examining the ten largest corporate political contributors. The majority
of corporations have approached political donations with the same
strategy that they would pursue investment portfolios—namely diversification. Seven of the ten largest contributing corporations donated roughly 60-40 to one party or the other. The remaining three
donated either one hundred percent or ninety-nine percent to only
a single candidate, namely the Huntsman Corporation via chairman Jon Huntsman Sr. to Jon Huntsman Jr.’s campaign and related
SuperPacs, Las Vegas Sands Corp. donating to Newt Gingrich’s
campaign and associated SuperPacs with ninety-five percent of the
eleven million dollars coming directly from CEO Sheldon Adelson,
and DreamWorks to the Democratic Party and the SuperPacs that
primarily support them.23
These examples support in large part the assumption that corporations differ in practice from people in their political contributions.
One way to analyze the future impacts and repercussions of this behavior is to utilize economic Game Theory. This branch in economics is known as an effective tool in analyzing potential outcomes for
interactions between parties. Through the use of simplification of
23
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real world situations, Game Theory provides a valuable insight for
why parties choose to act based on a matrix of potential outcomes.
To set up this model, we’ll begin with two participants: politicians and corporations. Each participant has a set of actions, and depending upon the actions of the other participant, they each receive
an outcome. Consider the following game matrix:

Politician
Favor			

Not Favor

Donate

(δα-β)+pz, β+pz

-β+pz, β+pz

Not Donate

δα+pz, +pz

0,0

Corporation

In this game δ represents the probability that the firm will receive a political favor and is a positively correlated function of β. β
is the corporation’s donation and also the politician’s benefit, and α
represents the benefit to the corporation from a political favor. The
variable z represents the fine for wrongful favors or bribery, and is
based upon the probability of discovery, p, and is a number between
0 and 1. This is also a two-stage game, meaning that the corporation goes first with Donate or Not Donate, and then the politician
responds by either Favor or Not Favor. While the matrix only shows
the payoffs for the first round of the game, the game can be to have
the same payoffs for any number of rounds, alternating between the
two players.
When playing out this game, the outcome, or equilibrium, is
found depending on certain conditions. As p approaches zero, the
likelihood of discovery also goes to zero, meaning that there are
essentially no repercussions to deter the corporation and politician
from improper behavior. Furthermore, for the corporation to always
donate, the term needs to be sufficiently related to the value of the
donation such that the corporation would have an optimal β value at
which the gains from α are sufficient to outweigh all potential costs
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and fines. Also, if the β term is high enough from the politician’s
perspective to outweigh the consequences of pz, then the politician
will be best motivated to favor the corporation. These conditions
lead to two equilibrium outcomes, either (Donate, Favor) or (Not
Donate, Not Favor). The first situation will always be the outcome
if the politician values future donations, thereby being motivated to
continue favoring the corporation rather than gain a onetime benefit.
The second outcome would be the equilibrium if the β donation is
too expensive to the firm with a low probability of return; also, if the
likelihood of discovery and fines were high enough, neither party
would be motivated to act improperly. This places a large burden
on the process for rigorous scrutiny. From a societal perception the
(Donate, Favor) outcome is potentially detrimental. This loss could
be translated into loss of influence in politics, feelings of marginalization, as well as policies being enacted that are in the best interests
of corporations to the detriment of persons in society.
This theoretical extension would conclude an end outcome of
either a society which is unable to properly oversee impropriety and
corruption leading to a corrupt outcome, or it results in a society
that properly regulates and dis-incentivizes collusion and corruption. In the latter of the two, without the ability to sway a politician,
the corporation has no motivation to donate—whether it is legal or
not. In the former situation, society becomes subject to the preferences of the corporation, essentially losing its voice in the political
process. To translate this back into the real world, this game would
suggest careful attention to the donating behaviors of corporations
in future election cycles. This would either help justify the Court’s
ruling to allow them to donate, as politicians maintain the public
interests despite corporate influence as reflected by declining corporate donation values, or it would signal a warning that corporations
are deriving unjust benefits via ever increasing donations.

IV. Separating and Defining Corporate Rights
In the Citizens United case, the winning argument focused on
the injustice of restricting all corporations from political involvement, when media corporations were allowed nearly unfettered
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political involvement.24 This line of reasoning relies heavily on
equating money-speech with the speech found in newspapers, journals, news broadcasts, etc. Since media corporations were exempt
from the Tillman Act, proponents of the aforementioned cases argued that all corporations should be exempt. In other words, the Tillman Act was argued to be unconstitutional. The Court agreed.25 Yet,
it is important to note that the focus of this argument is weakened by
the explicit protection of the First Amendment to “the press.” This
would grant the media relief from the Tillman Act through the direct
language of the First Amendment.
When dealing with political speech, there is a potential benefit
to distinguishing between corporations and other interest groups. By
limiting corporate involvement in politics, Congress would diminish the potential for governmental corruption. Delineation between
corporations that were incorporated with the purpose of expressing
political thought from those that were incorporated with the primary
intent to maximize wealth would provide a sensible method of distinguishing which types of corporations could be allowed to donate
to political causes. Congress could enact a law allowing for political
speech and contributions from certain corporations and not others,
using the distinction of wealth maximizing or non-profit as defined
above. The value to this is that through a non-profit organization’s
reliance on donations themselves, the organization is a better representation of public voice. This would make the volume of an organization’s voice dependent on the voices of real people, rather than a
factor of economic booms and profit margins.

V. Conclusion
Clear language detailing the exact rights granted to corporations
is permissible, and even desirable in the United States. This is supported by a careful analysis of the risks and benefits of unlimited
corporate donations in politics. These effects are spread across society,
24

Editorial, Justice Alito, Citizens United, and the Press, N. Y. Times, Nov.
20, 2012, at A26.
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as seen through economic forecasting of political behavior. It appears that the ramifications of Citizens United will have an overall
negative effect on society. Therefore, it would be prudent to curtail the harmful consequences of the ruling. In order to do this efficiently, the high-risk factors for corruption and societal detriment
should be observed carefully over the next several political cycles. In
the event that the ruling does prove to be detrimental, the Supreme
Court should consider limiting the rights of corporate persons. This
action would be fully justified in the law under Justice Steven’s argument that while corporations are protected as persons in some aspects of the law, by not being actual members of society other facets
are not applicable or should be denied them for the protection of
human persons in society.
With this style of reform, those groups who were chartered to
specifically engage in political discussion would still be granted the
right to political free speech, fulfilling the purpose of their incorporation. At the same time, the government would be able to more easily control the effects of corporations on politics and society.

